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1 INTRODUCTION 
Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) schemes will involve handling and transportation of 
CO2 on a hitherto unprecedented scale and magnitude. For instance, capturing and storing the 
emissions from a standard large 1,000 MW coal-fired power plant will require handling of 
about 30,000 tons CO2 per day. In contrast, today’s largest inventories of pressurized carbon 
dioxide are found in storage terminals for commercial carbon dioxide, a large storage tank 
holds about 300-350 tons, and the combined storage capacity may be 1,000-1,500 tons (Hed-
lund 2012). 
Most CCS projects currently under consideration involve pipeline transport to the injection 
facility. Transmission pipe-line risk studies have assumed that block valves will close in case of 
pipeline damage and limit the release amount to the inventory of a single pipeline section. To 
give a sense of magnitude and scale a severed 150 bar 19” pipeline section only 8 km long may 
release 1,300 tons of carbon dioxide in about 3-4 minutes (DOE 2007).  
The safety of the general population in the vicinity of a transmission pipeline is a potential 
concern. Gaseous carbon dioxide is often regarded as non-toxic and inert. Carbon dioxide is 
nowhere near meeting the criteria for being a toxic substance and is therefore not subjected to 
existing industrial safety legislation, for instance the European Seveso Directive. However, it is 
a potential concern if the handling of unprecedented large quantities, could result in carbon di-
oxide having major accident potential, to the effect that CCS projects become an emerging in-
dustrial risk. 
2 THEORETICAL HAZARD ANALYSIS 
A number of studies have reported the application of dispersion modeling techniques to predict 
hazard ranges for carbon dioxide transmission pipeline failures. The overwhelming consensus 
seems to be that hazard ranges are modest. For instance, worst case hazard analysis for the re-
lease of 1,300 tons of carbon dioxide in about 3-4 minutes suggests that acute life threatening 
concentrations may result within 70 m from the point of release and that no serious threat to 
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human health exists beyond 200 m. Some authors argue that these predictions exaggerate the 
hazard, and that CCS pipelines only constitute a negligible, if any, hazard potential (Hedlund 
2012). 
3 PAST CARBON DIOXIDE ACCIDENT HISTORY 
The available accident history involving sudden releases of large quantities of CO2 is very lim-
ited. Pressurized storage vessels holding up to about 50 tons of liquid carbon dioxide have been 
a source of major accidents. Sudden catastrophic failure of the containment vessel has generat-
ed a blast wave and high-velocity fragments killing workers and causing extensive property 
damage. For instance, the sudden failure of a 15 bar 30 m3 carbon dioxide storage vessel in 
Hungary hurled a 2.8 tons fragment 150 m, a one ton fragment 250 m and smaller fragments up 
to 400 m, damaging several nearby residential building, killing nine workers and seriously in-
juring 15. Five of the fatalities were frozen to death. A layer of dry ice covered the nearby facil-
ities making recue efforts impossible (Vörös and Honti 1974).  
A natural disaster involving a large release of carbon dioxide took place in Lake Nyos, Cam-
eroon, in 1986, involving perhaps up to 1.5 million tons. Apart from the extreme Lake Nyos 
disaster, accident cases on record comprise releases in the range of a few tons to tens of tons 
only, none in the range of hundreds or thousands of tons, which would occur in the event of a 
CCS transmission pipeline accident. Past accidents reported to date are therefore unable to pro-
vide an empirical perspective on predicted hazard distances for CCS projects. 
4 CO2 OUTBURSTS IN THE EVAPORITE DEPOSITS OF THE WERRA DISTRICT 
There is however a source of information on accidental releases of large amounts of pressurized 
liquid (dense phase) carbon dioxide which so far has only been sporadically mentioned in the 
literature. The occurrence of gas in salt mines and caverns has presented serious problems to 
facility operators. Salt mines have long experienced sudden, usually unexpected expulsions of 
gas and salt from a production face, commonly known as outbursts. Outbursts can release over 
one million cubic feet of methane and fractured salt, and are responsible for the lives of numer-
ous miners and explosions. Equipment, production time, and even entire mines have been lost 
due to outbursts (Ehgartner et al 1998). 
The potash salt mines of the Werra district in central Germany are unique for the presence of 
pockets of large amounts carbon dioxide in the underground. The carbon dioxide is of volcanic 
origin and it has migrated along local fault lines and rising basalt pipes and become entrapped 
in the geological formations. This is particularly true for the evaporite deposits if water has also 
been present. Because potash salts are highly soluble complex local re-dissolution processes 
can transform and redistribute salts, and carbon dioxide may become embedded in the structure 
of the re-crystallized salt minerals. The potash deposits are typically 500+ m below the surface 
and embedded carbon dioxide is in its dense phase because of the pressure exerted by the 
weight of the overburden.  
The Werra potash deposits were discovered in the mid-1800s and early exploration drilling 
crews occasionally encountered major carbon dioxide pockets. In 1895, a borehole encountered 
a rich pocket at 347 m depth near Leimbach (Hundskopf). The borehole yielded high purity 
carbon dioxide at a pressure of 33 atmosphere gauge in quantities that made industrial produc-
tion of carbon dioxide economically feasible. It eventually produced more than 50,000 tons 
CO2 from 1896 to 1950. The production peaked in 1920 with 1,500 tons that year. In 1911, a 
sudden pressure surge took place that ruptured the surface valve, destroyed the production 
building and killed the guard on duty inside. While drilling a borehole near Unteralba, carbon 
dioxide was encountered at 687 m depth resulting in a geyser-like blowout which damaged the 
derrick and forced the drilling crew to retreat. The blowout lasted for 14 days and led to the 
formation of a 3-4 m tall pile of ice. Other boreholes have released up to 1,000 m3 per hour of 
carbon dioxide for extended periods. By 1958, the total quantity emitted from boreholes was es-
timated at 450 million m3 (Müller 1958:18). 
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Figure 1. Pocket of CO2 encountered during 
exploration drilling leading to blowout 
(Duchrow 1997). 
Pockets of carbon dioxide was also commonly 
encountered below ground, sometimes as loud 
bursts of salt, sometimes seeping out of crev-
ices releasing flakes of dry ice into the mine 
tunnels.  There was also a diffuse but sub-
stantial emission of carbon dioxide from the 
evaporite minerals, which was continuously 
removed by the mine ventilation system.  
Based on measurements of the CO2 concentra-
tion in the Menzengraben exhaust ventilation 
air the quantity of carbon dioxide silently 
emitted from this mine was estimated at 
883,000 m3 per year. 
The main concern was sudden violent out-
bursts of salt and carbon dioxide.  Blasting 
work was known to be able to trigger major 
outbursts and gas-tight safety chambers were 
built where miners preemptively took refuge 
during blasting.  On the 31.12.1938 two min-
ers left a safety chamber in the Ernst Thäl-
mann mine after blasting.  Upon leaving 
“they suddenly heard howling and roaring 
winds, like the most severe storm, and the 
noise of overturned conveyor cars coming 
tumbling down the tunnels.  They immediate 
returned to the chamber.” (Müller 1958:66). 
 
The first major release of carbon dioxide in the Menzengraben mine took place in 1926 with 
loud expulsions of gasses and flakes of dry ice, which continued for about eight hours. The 
mine crew reported a discernible temperature drop near the mine face but did not experience 
labored breathing even though they ventured close to the source in order to scoop up samples of 
dry ice in paper cups. A crew working in a nearby section of the Menzengraben mine reported 
powerful detonation-like blasts, each lasting for about 7-8 minutes, which reportedly sounded 
like machine gun fire. This particular section of the mine had abundant gas inclusions and 
should later produce the major outbursts of 3.6.1943, 13.10.1951 and 7.7.1953 (Müller 
1958:25-27). 
The Menzengraben mine was particularly plagued by outbursts, in part because large CO2 
pockets were frequently encountered there, in part because the mine was relatively small; the 
cavity volume was about 500,000 m3 by 1953. Because some CO2 outbursts were large and oc-
casionally even exceeded the mine cavity volume, highly destructive gas velocities could be at-
tained in the mine tunnel system. After a string of serious outbursts the mining authority 
(TBBI) in Erfurt passed an order in 1949 forbidding blasting in the Menzengraben mine when 
personnel were below ground. Had it not been for this order, all miners below ground would 
have been killed in the 1953 outburst. Less draconian measures taken to mitigate the hazard in-
cluded automatically closing heavy duty drop doors to retard depressurization and attenuate de-
structive gas velocities in the tunnels, powerful ventilation machinery and portable self-
contained breathing apparatus for emergency evacuation carried by all miners. Preventive 
measures included small-bore prognosis drilling to determine the nature and CO2 content of the 
minerals about to be mined, which permitted a forecast of outburst probability and severity.  
The sheer size of these outbursts makes them potentially interesting in a carbon dioxide haz-
ard analysis perspective because the amounts released exceed those of the existing industrial 
accident history by one or two orders of magnitude. In some cases the outbursts led to uncon-
trolled venting of carbon dioxide to the surface exposing people above ground to the hazards of 
carbon dioxide. Selected cases are presented in Table 1. The mines in operation today have 
such large cavity volumes that outbursts are attenuated and uncontrolled surface venting is 
highly improbable.  
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Table 1. Selected outbursts that led to uncontrolled venting of gas above ground from mine 
shafts. 
Date Mine salt  
burst 
(tons)a 
CO2  
released  
(m3)b 
Comment 
1953.07.07 Menzengraben 65,000 700,000c Venting of gas above ground for more than 
20 minutes, severe destruction of tunnels, 
shafts and surface buildings 
1943.06.03 Menzengraben 18,000 450,000 Venting of gas above ground for more than 8 
minutes, damage to shaft 
1950.05.10 "Marx-Engels" 20,000 not stated Rock fall, gas outburst with salt boulders 
1938.12.31 "Ernst Thälmann" 15,000 200,000 Venting of gas above ground 
1951.10.13 Menzengraben 13,000 200,000 Venting of gas above ground 
1947.03.22 Menzengraben 8,000 104,000 Venting of gas above ground, gas retarding 
drop doors destroyed 
1942.01.29 Menzengraben 5,000 75,000 Venting of gas above ground 
1908.11.27 Dietlas 2,700 18,000 Venting of gas above ground 
1957.10.15 Menzengraben 22,000 400,000 Venting of gas above ground for more than 
20 minutes, no destruction, gas retarding drop 
doors operated as intended 
a Only the amount of salt hauled to the surface is known reliably 
b Only crude indications of carbon dioxide outburst volumes are available, the estimation procedure is rarely stat-
ed but is likely based on the salt burst quantity and an assumed ratio of gas per ton salt.   
c This value clearly inaccurate, best available estimate is 1,000,000 - 2,400,000 m3 (Hedlund 2012) 
Source: Müller (1958:34) 
5 THE 1953 SUPER OUTBURST 
Shortly before midnight on July 7, 1953, the Menzengraben mine experienced a 
"Superausbruch" (super outburst) which ravaged the mine and led to uncontrolled forceful vent-
ing of carbon dioxide at the surface for more than 20 minutes. The gas came rushing up #2 
Shaft with unprecedented force and shattered the roof before exiting “into the open air”. Large 
amounts of splintered construction timber were scattered over “the entire area” up to 150 m 
from the #2 Shaft House. Damage to electrical installations below ground caused a power fail-
ure which silenced the factory alarm siren. With the sky overcast the power failure left the mine 
and the two nearby settlements in total darkness.  
The escaping gas sounded like "four to five large locomotives blowing steam at the same 
time accompanied by a deep rumbling undertone". The sound lasted for about 25 minutes. It 
was wind still and “in a relatively short time the entire valley from Stadtlengsfeld to Dietlas 
was completely filled with concentrated carbon dioxide” (Junghans 1953).  
The outburst was triggered by blasting. Because the mining authority had issued an order 
forbidding blasting in the Menzengraben mine when personnel were below ground there was 
nobody below ground. However, a considerable number of miners from the afternoon shift, 
who had just left the mine, were still in the vicinity of the shaft yard (Junghans 1969:241). They 
had a good knowledge of the dangers of carbon dioxide and practical experience with working 
in potentially hazardous carbon dioxide environments below ground. The immediately fled up-
hill the western ridge. A contemporary newspaper reported that heroic scenes unfolded as min-
ers at great personal risk went back and pulled unconscious fellow workers to higher ground.  
The inhabitants of the two nearby settlements were initially bewildered by the wailing and 
then silenced siren, the electrical blackout and the noise of the escaping gas. As soon as they 
realized the gas danger however, they fled their homes to the safety of the heights of the eastern 
ridge. Junghans (1953) praised the exemplary cold-headed behavior of the individuals “though 
many, clad only in nightgowns, barely saved their lives”. 
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Figure 2  The opening of the cavity 
created in the 1953 outburst. Note 
person standing on pile of ejected salt 
for scale. The cavity, which extended 
200 m into the salt deposits, is the 
largest on record. (Source: Junghans 
1953) 
 
 
Figure 3  Destruction in tunnel. Mine rail cars 
hurled around by the force of the outburst, rail 
dislodged. Some rail cars had end walls torn 
off (Source: Historisches Stadtarchiv Stad-
tlengsfeld). 
 
 
Figure 4. Interior of #2 Shaft House.  
The shaft opening was partly cov-
ered by a 8-10 mm steel deck plate 
which was torn and bent upwards. 
Splintered construction timber and 
iron beams are scattered around 
(Source: Junghans 1953) 
  
 
Figure 5. View through the 10 m2 opening in 
the iron reinforced concrete roof of #2 Shaft 
House down the shaft. The gas forced its way 
up and shattered the roof before exiting verti-
cally upwards (source: Historisches Stadtar-
chiv Stadtlengsfeld).  
 
 
Figure 6.  Location of shaft #2 (arrow) of the now closed Menzengraben mine hidden behind 
tree line. The 1953 outburst flooded the "entire valley" with "concentrated carbon dioxide" and 
forced the inhabitants of the two miners' settlement (boxes) to flee uphill for safety. (Photo: 
Frank Hedlund, 2010) 
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Three persons were killed. A repair shop superintendent was struck by falling debris and 
died from head trauma. A woman was killed due to asphyxiation in the canteen at distance 100 
m. A craftsman, died in the lowlands at distance 300 m due to asphyxiation. There were as-
phyxiation casualties (not fatalities) in a forest house 530 m away. Carbon dioxide concentra-
tions of 10–30% may have occurred 450 m from the point of release for at least 45 min. It is 
noteworthy that the two asphyxiation fatalities were non-miners (Hedlund 2012). 
Hedlund (2012) examined the outburst in an industrial risk analysis perspective. Standard 
dispersion modeling with conservative inputs predicts that the high-momentum release from the 
roof of Shaft House would dilute safely and never reach ground. The predicted concentration 
contours cannot possibly explain the harm observed. 
6 CONCLUSION 
Accidental releases of large quantities of CO2 may provide an empirical perspective on predic-
tive dispersion modeling. The extreme 1953 carbon dioxide outburst at Menzengraben fills a 
gap in the available accident history with an estimated release amount of 1,100-3,900 tons, al-
most two orders of magnitude larger than the largest industrial accidents currently on record. 
This is particularly relevant as releases of this magnitude may occur in the event of a transmis-
sion pipeline rupture associated with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS).  
Published predicted hazard ranges for carbon dioxide transmission pipeline failures indicate 
that distances are modest. There seems to be general consensus that CCS activities pose limited 
major hazard potential. Standard dispersion modeling indicates that the 1953 Super Outburst 
would dilute safely and pose little hazard to its surroundings. This result is not in agreement 
with observed harm and witness statements than an entire valley was filled with dangerous con-
centrations of carbon dioxide. Additional research is required to resolve this discrepancy.  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I'm grateful to Rolf Leimbach, Ortschronist, Stadtlengsfeld, for providing photos from Histor-
isches Stadtarchiv Stadtlengsfeld. 
 
REFERENCES 
DOE, 2007. Final Risk Assessment Report for the FutureGen Project Environmental Impact Statement. 
Department of Energy (DoE), USA. Contract No. DE-AT26-06NT42921.  
Duchrow, G. 1997 Der 100-jährige "Rhönmarsch" in die Kohlensäurefelder des Südthüringischen Kali-
bergbaus. Der Anschnitt. Zeitschrift für Kunst und Kultur im Bergbau 49(4):123-147.  
Ehgartner, B.; Neal, J.; Hinkebein, T. 1998 Gas releases in salt. Sandia National Laboratories Report, 
Albuquerque, New Mexico and Livermore, California. SAND 98-1354. DOI 10.2172/656531. 
Hedlund, F.H. 2012. The extreme carbon dioxide outburst at the Menzengraben potash mine 7 July 1953.  
Safety Science 50(3): 537-553. 
Junghans, R. 1953. Der schwere CO2-Ausbruch auf der Schachtanlage Menzengraben des VEB Kaliwerk 
Heiligenroda am 7.7.1953, seine Ursachen und Folgen.  Bergbautechnik 3(9):457-462 (part 1), 
3(11):579-589 (part 2). 
Junghans, R. 1969. Lehrbuch der Sicherheitstechnik. Band 1, Grubensicherheit. Deutscher Verlag der 
Grundstoffindustrie, Leipzig, 1969. 
Müller, W. 1958. Über das Auftreten von Kohlensäure im Werra-Kaligebiet. Freiberger Forschungshefte 
A-101. Berlin 1958. 
Vörös, M.; Honti, Gy. 1974. Explosion of a liquid CO2 storage vessel in a carbon dioxide plant. In: C.L. 
Buschmann (ed) Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in the Process Industries, 1974, pp 337-346. 
